more institutionalized in recent years,8 some pointing to evidence of rationalization,9 legalization'? and technocratization."
Yet institutionalized political competition is critical to success in institutionalizing law, regulations and succession. It creates the norm-based space for disagreement or competition on a range of policy and personnel issues. It may include both formal and informal political competition, as it does in most political systems. What separates it from uninstitutionalized competition is that it occurs within agreed "rules of the game" by agreed actors. In China, I will argue, both formal contestation, through the National People's Congress for example, as well as informal contestation through centre-provincial bargaining, for instance, have lessened, not increased, in recent years.
Thus, while not disputing the progress that China has made in other aspects of institutionalization, it has regressed in the institutionalization of political competition. Contestation has become less coherent and complex (in the Huntington sense) than it was in the 1980s and early 1990s and less constrained by accepted norms (in the modem sense). For this reason the overall level of institutionalization remains modest at best.'2
Political History
Attempts to repress sanctioned political competition have been termed antipolitics, de-politicization or the end of politics. Authoritarian regimes, of course, are founded on the idea of anti-politics, and the People's Republic of China is no exception. After a brief period of genuine contestation in the early 1950s, when the Party allowed its civil war allies to hold some cabinet posts, Mao put an end to politics through a series of fearsome personal interventions and a highly ideological commitment to unitary principles guiding society and the state. Participation was expanded during the Cultural Revolution, but the scope for choice remained highly circumscribed. argument altogether. His new slogan, "pay attention to politics" (jiang zhengzhi), was no less ironic than Mao's "politics above all" (zhengzhi yadao yiqie) in its drive to eliminate politics. The anti-political trend continues in the Hu Jintao era now dawning.
China has thus returned, after a brief interlude of contestation that might be dated from approximately 1976 to the mid-1990s, to a period of anti-politics in which both participation and contestation are repressed by unitary principles of rule. It would be too much to say that it has lurched from one form of totalitarianism to another, given the reduction in state control over society and the de facto pluralism that exists within the state itself. However, repression of contestation at the national level has returned.
Evidence of Change
Visible eruptions of NPC activism are one good indicator of the decline of contestation."8 In the 1980s and early 1990s, large non-approval votes over policies like special legislative powers for Shenzhen (40 per cent non-approval), the Three Gorges dam (33 per cent) and the national banking law (32 per cent) were commonplace.19 In 1995, 37 per cent of delegates failed to approve the appointment of Li Peng's corrupt associate Jiang Chunyun as vice premier, while in 1998 a record-high 45 per cent failed to approve the procurator-general's report.
That was the high point, however. In 1998, the contestatory Qiao Shi was replaced as NPC chairman by the anti-political Li Peng. Since then, the most dramatic event in NPC politics has been a committee-level rejection of a highway tolls law in 1999. At the 2003 meeting, the NPC was asked to confirm state appointments for three close allies of outgoing Party head Jiang Zemin-Zeng Qinghong as vice president, Huang Ju as executive vice premier and Chen Zhili as state councillor. Despite being widely disliked or distrusted in the Party at large-shown by the difficulties all three faced in gaining appointments in the central Party-state in the 1990s20-the non-approval rates for the three hovered between 9 per cent and 13 per cent. At the same meeting, one of the few active delegates to the NPC was mysteriously stripped of her position.21
The autonomy of the provincial People's Congresses, meanwhile, is being suffocated. In 1987, every one of the 29 provincial-level People's Congresses was chaired by a person other than the Party secretary or provincial governor.
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The best discussion on this era is Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in PostMao China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). The figures in this paragraph except for 1998 all come from Table 5 .2, pp. 84-8. It is notable that politics has not declined at the local level, and indeed may be continuing to increase there. There has been an emergence of real contestation in some provinces, especially wealthy ones like Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu, which face the most pressing need to forge a consensus on governance.36 Challenges are coming from people like Yao Lifa, an anti-corruption and education crusader whose candidacy for the Qianjiang City People's Congress in Hubei Province was rejected by the Party three times before a mass signature campaign brought him to office.37
There are also some specific-issue areas at the national level where genuine contestation seems to have survived. One of these is the securities and stockmarket sector where an active media, listed companies with savvy public relations departments, globally-minded regulators and a mostly hands-off State Council have combined to create a kind of "special zone" of political Those elders mostly died in the 1990s.61 Thus a functional explanation can be found: that the death of the elders made continued contestation a threat to elite stability. In contrast to conventional views of the elders as a restraint on political competition, this explanation suggests that they were its foundation, given the well-known problem of managing intra-elite conflicts in authoritarian regimes. A simple back-of-the-envelope model can illustrate how the death or removal of party elders from the polity might cause instability to rise for every given level of contestation.62 The result is that a regime seeking to maximize legitimacy will curtail the degree of contestation. Governance will worsen. 
Costs
Some say that politics does not matter much in China.64 The society and economy are too free and the political system is running well enough to make political competition unnecessary. The Hong Kong-based newsweekly Asiaweek even celebrated this "end of politics" in 2000: "Most young Chinese these days couldn't care less about who is up and who is down in the party Politburo". 65 Yet politics is and always will be central to any country because it is the collective life of a nation. The "basic structures" of today's China-the laissezfaire economy, the proceduralist government, etc.-are creations of politics. To say that they make political competition unnecessary is merely to say that political leaders have chosen to make this so.
Merely by reaching important decisions through uncontested procedures, the "end of politics" imposes costs on China in terms of injustice, something that is noted more and more in China itself. 66 We cannot make predictions about the timing of this transition, given the contingencies of authoritarian survival. What is foreseeable is that the decline of
